What Was the Persian Satraps’ Rebellion of the 360s BCE?

The Great Satraps’ Revolt of the 360s BCE was a wave of coordinated provincial revolts against King Artaxerxes II (r. 404–358 BCE), in which several of the most powerful satraps of the western empire — including the satraps of Asia Minor, Syria, and briefly Egypt — rose in rebellion against the Achaemenid central government. The revolt lasted almost a decade, demonstrated the limits of central control over the western satrapies, and marked the beginning of the long decline of the Achaemenid state that would culminate in the conquests of Alexander the Great. The standard modern dating is 360–350 BCE, though some scholars put the start as early as 367 BCE. The standard modern treatment is Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander (2002), pp. 651–657, with Weiskopf, The So-Called “Great Satraps’ Revolt,” 366–360 B.C. (1989) the most thorough technical study.

The political context

The reign of Artaxerxes II was a long and troubled one. The most serious crisis of the early reign was the war of succession with his brother Cyrus the Younger — the episode immortalised in Xenophon’s Anabasis, in which Cyrus the Younger raised a force of Greek mercenaries and marched on Babylon, only to be defeated and killed at the battle of Cunaxa in 401 BCE. The war of succession was followed by a long period of conflict with Sparta, in which the Achaemenid state supported the Greek cities of Asia Minor and the Greek enemies of Sparta. By the 360s, the imperial treasury was under strain and the western satraps were increasingly autonomous.

The court of Artaxerxes II was riven by faction. The queen Parysatis, the mother of Cyrus the Younger, exercised considerable influence at court, and the various eunuchs, generals, and officials of the court competed for the king’s ear. The eunuch Bagoas, who would later play a key role in the accession of Artaxerxes III (whom he eventually poisoned in 338 BCE), was an influential figure in these years. The king was often unable to exercise the kind of personal authority that Darius and Xerxes had exercised, and the western satraps were increasingly willing to act on their own.

The outbreak

The Great Satraps’ Revolt broke out c. 360 BCE, though the chronology of the western revolts is jumbled and difficult to reconstruct. The principal rebels included Datames, the satrap of Cappadocia; Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia and Hellespontine Phrygia; Mausolus, the satrap of Caria; and Orontes, the satrap of Mysia. The revolt soon spread to other provinces, and the rebels were joined by the satraps of Syria, of Phoenicia, and, briefly, of Egypt. The chronology is uneven: Datames’ revolt started c. 362 BCE, before the more famous 360 BCE outbreak, and Ariobarzanes’ revolt started c. 367 BCE, the first of the series. Mausolus joined later. The picture is of a wave of provincial revolts in the 360s rather than a single coordinated uprising.

The motives of the rebels are difficult to determine with precision. Some, including Ariobarzanes, were personal enemies of the king or of the court faction that dominated Artaxerxes II. Others, including Mausolus of Caria, were ambitious dynasts who wished to establish their own power in the western provinces. Still others, including Datames, may have been motivated by the desire to reform the Achaemenid state rather than to break it up. Whatever the motives, the revolt demonstrated that the satrapy system, for all its sophistication, was vulnerable to coordinated action by the most powerful provincial governors.

The course of the revolt

The course of the revolt was complex. The rebels, well-financed and well-positioned, were able to coordinate their actions across a wide geographical area, and the Achaemenid court was unable to suppress the revolt by a single decisive campaign. The revolt lasted almost a decade, and it required the full resources of the Achaemenid state, including the standing army, the navy, and the treasury, to suppress. The fighting was particularly intense in Asia Minor, where the rebels held several fortresses, and in Egypt, where the Egyptian satrap briefly joined the revolt and threatened the Syrian frontier.

Datames, the most capable of the rebel generals, was assassinated in 362 BCE — killed by his father-in-law Mithridates, an Armenian satrap, not in open battle. His death removed the most dangerous opponent of the central government. The other rebels were gradually isolated, and the revolt was eventually put down by a combination of military campaigns and political concessions. The revolt, however, had demonstrated the limits of central control over the western provinces and left the Achaemenid state exhausted.

The consequences

The consequences of the Great Satraps’ Revolt were far-reaching. The revolt had demonstrated that the Achaemenid state was vulnerable to coordinated action by the satraps, and it had weakened the prestige of the central government in the western provinces. The revolt had also required the expenditure of considerable resources, and the financial exhaustion of the central government was a major factor in the long decline of the Achaemenid state. The revolt created a precedent of satrapal independence that would be difficult to reverse: the western satraps, even after the revolt had been suppressed, would continue to exercise considerable autonomy.

The revolt was a major factor in the long decline of the Achaemenid state that would culminate in the conquests of Alexander the Great. The Achaemenid state, exhausted by the revolt and weakened by the loss of prestige in the western provinces, was unable to respond effectively to the rising power of Macedon under Philip II. The defeat of the Achaemenid expedition against Macedon in 338 BCE, the death of Philip II, and the accession of Alexander III in 336 BCE were all part of a long process in which the Achaemenid state lost its strategic initiative. The Great Satraps’ Revolt of the 360s BCE was a key moment in that process.

What it tells us

The Greek sources, particularly Xenophon, present the revolt as a crisis of the Achaemenid imperial system, in which the satraps, having grown too powerful, sought to break away from the central government. The Achaemenid inscriptions, although they do not refer to the revolt directly, present the reign of Artaxerxes II as a period of crisis and difficulty. Modern historians, starting with Weiskopf and developed by Tuplin in his Xenophon and his World (2004) chapter, have emphasised the complexity of the revolt, the diversity of the motives of the rebels, and the way in which the revolt was suppressed. The standard account is Briant (2002), and the most thorough technical study is Weiskopf (1989).

The Satraps’ Revolt is a key event in the history of the Achaemenid state, and it deserves a prominent place in any account of the dynasty. The revolt demonstrated the strengths and the limits of the satrapy system, the importance of the central government’s ability to control the most powerful satraps, and the vulnerability of the Achaemenid state to coordinated action by the provincial governors. The revolt also marked the beginning of the long decline of the Achaemenid state, a decline that would culminate, almost seventy years later, in the conquests of Alexander the Great and the end of the dynasty that had founded the first Persian empire.

Reading

  • Briant, Pierre. From Cyrus to Alexander (2002), pp. 651–657
  • Wiesehöfer, Josef. Ancient Persia (1996), pp. 130–135
  • Tuplin, Christopher. “The Revolt of the Satraps” in Xenophon and his World (2004)
  • Weiskopf, Michael. The So-Called “Great Satraps’ Revolt,” 366–360 B.C. (1989)